People Haven't Had Enough of Experts: Technocratic Attitudes among Citizens in Nine European Democracies

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Political representation theory postulates that technocracy and populism mount a twofold challenge to party democracy, while also standing at odds with each other in the vision of representation they advocate. Can these relationships also be observed empirically at the level of citizens and what does this mean for alternative forms of political representation? This article investigates technocratic attitudes using three key dimensions – Expertise, Elitism, Anti-politics – and identifies citizen groups that follow a technocratic, populist and party democratic profile in nine European democracies. Our analysis shows that technocratic attitudes are pervasive across many European countries and can be meaningfully distinguished from populist attitudes, though important overlaps remain. It concludes with an investigation into the electoral behaviour of different representation profiles and a discussion regarding citizen frustration with politics and increasing demands for expertise, which drive preferences for alternative types of governance.

Keywords: technocratic attitudes, political representation, populist attitudes, experts, latent class analysis

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In the run up to the UK's referendum on EU membership in 2016, the Justice Secretary and a leading figure in the "Leave Campaign" claimed that "people in this country have had enough of experts", in an effort to rebuke statements by economic experts regarding the financial repercussions of Brexit. While the British people went on to vote in favour of leaving the European Union (EU), the validity of his claim remains doubtful. Evidence from mass surveys suggest that there is a large group of citizens – in many countries a majority – who would rather have experts, and not politicians, govern according what they think is best for their country.[1] Further, in the face of impending crises of recent years, technocratic cabinets have been put into place in a number of countries, sparking a debate on the relationship between technocracy and democracy (Brunclík and Parízek 2018; McDonnell and Valbruzzi 2014).[2] At the same time, a well-documented populist backlash is taking place, often interpreted as a reaction to ineffective democratic pluralism and "out-of-touch" technocratic governance. It appears therefore that many democratic governments are being challenged by demands for both more responsiveness and responsibility at the same time.

Extant work suggests that citizens with populist attitudes believe politics should be guided by the will of the people, unconstrained by pluralist procedures and by the intervention of elites. We maintain that on the other side of this spectrum, there are citizens who favour delegating decisions to experts and, if necessary, disregarding the people's will. Experts are

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[1] The latest wave of the World Values Survey fielded between 2010–14 showed that more than 80% of Romanian and Polish citizens are favourable to being governed by independent experts, while more than 50% across Western democracies. The question reads: "[W]ould you say it is a very good, fairly good, fairly bad or very bad way of governing this country? Having experts, not government, make decisions according to what they think is best for the country" (WVS, Wave 6).

[2] The Italian government of Mario Monti (2011) and Greek government of Lukas Papademos (2011) attracted the most attention in the public sphere, especially as their programme was, in large part, to implement financial austerity measures. There have been other recent technocratic cabinet appointments in Europe, such as the Bajnai government in Hungary (2009) and the Ciolos government in Romania (2016).

perceived to possess the competence to address complex problems, without being misguided by short-term electoral interests constricting politicians and political parties. They also do not need to be responsive to an often uninformed or misinformed citizenry that does not possess the time and competence to make policy decisions.[3] Yet, unlike populist attitudes, mass attitudes towards the role of technocratic experts and support for responsible (rather than responsive) decision making, have not been the object of systematic empirical analysis.

While theoretical work has pointed to the relevance of two types of challenges to party democracy – the populist and the technocratic – empirical research has exclusively focussed on the former (Akkerman et al. 2014, 2017; Castanho Silva et al. 2010, 2017; Oliver and Rahn 2016; Schulz et al. 2017; Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel 2018). Technocratic attitudes represent a parallel potential challenge to party-based representative democracy to populism. In this article, we build on theoretical treatments of technocracy and its relation to both populism and party democracy (Caramani 2017). Our aim is to investigate if there are citizens harbouring technocratic attitudes in established democracies, in what numbers and with what effect. We measure technocratic attitudes along three dimensions of Elitism, Expertise and Anti-politics and identify citizens who follow a technocratic profile based on their response patterns on technocratic and populist survey questions. We find that citizens who hold technocratic attitudes form a sizeable group in many of the countries under study.

Further, we distinguish the technocratic from the populist and partisan democratic profiles and explore the overlaps and differences on their preferences for political representation.[4] We find that, although elitism (as a critique of "the people") is incompatible

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[3] The classical model of political representation as mediated by political parties (APSA 1950; Schattschneider 1942) has, in the last decades, come under increasing strain (Mair 2009) in its attempt to bridge responsiveness to the people and responsible decision making.

[4] Also the theoretical comparison of populism and technocracy as types of representation has pointed to areas of overlap, in particular their anti-pluralist view of society and the objective

with populism, in practice populist attitudes go hand in hand with a preference for expertise in politics. Finally, we explore the differences among citizens with "technocratic", "populist" and "partisan profiles" in terms of demographic characteristics and attitudes. We conclude with an examination of the voting intentions of these groups in the case of Italy and a discussion of the implications of our findings for research on voter and elite behaviour.

From Technocracy to Technocratic Attitudes

Technocracy can be understood as the exercise of political power by technical elites (instead of democratically competing and elected ones), with competence, expertise, neutrality and efficiency as their source of legitimacy and with responsible trusteeship as principle of representation (Caramani 2017; Centeno 1993, 1994; Dargent 2015; Fischer 1990; Meynaud 1969). As an "absolute" conception of power, technocracy is seldom championed openly or observed empirically. We define technocracy as a form of representation and source of legitimate power within democratic systems that can take various grades, from advisory positions for experts, to the appointment of independent technocratic prime ministers or ministers to the executive, or even entire cabinets (Pastorella 2015; Brint 1990).

At the heart of technocracy rests a representation principle that emphasizes acting on behalf of the people on the basis of knowledge and expertise, aiming at an independent identification and implementation of objective solutions to societal problems, which ensures progress and long-term results (Habermas 2015; Radaelli 1999).[5] Competence and merit form the basis for membership into the elite (as opposed to privilege or popular support). Using its

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solutions independent of particularistic interests (Caramani 2017).

[5] According to Pitkin (1967), active representation (differently than descriptive and symbolic representation) implies acting on behalf and in the interest of those represented.

skills and scientific expertise, this "knowledge elite" is better placed to provide effective solutions to complex social problems (Bersch 2016). In addition, since technocrats are independent from short-term partisan or ideological interests, they are free from the constraints of serving parts of society (groups, classes, networks). They are not bound to popular approval and, hence, can provide responsible governance with a long-term perspective for the betterment of the entire community.

Technocracy is, therefore, elitist at its core. It does not shy away from identifying an elite – based on its knowledge, expertise, superior academic credentials, intellect and know-how – distinct from ordinary people. This elite is comprised by "those who know best" how to guide society and is contrasted to ordinary citizens, who are less equipped in terms of skills and time. Representation follows the "trustee" over the "delegate" model and the responsive over the responsive mandate (Bardi et al. 2014; Mair 2009).

Crucially, the elitism of technocracy does not include the political class, selected through political parties and elections. Technocracy entails a two-fold criticism of representative party democracy. First, following from the elitist dimension, technocracy is critical of democracy for its reliance on popular support, which binds decision makers to short-termism and responsiveness to uninformed citizens. The second criticism is anti-partisan, directed against political parties that aim to represent parts of society, sectional interests and particular ideologies that hinder the advancement of society *as a whole*.[6] In the technocratic mind-set, what is "right" and "good" for society is objective and does not need to be aggregated from a plurality of subjective interests.[7] Parties and interest groups are damaging to the prospects of

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[6] Technocratic views share similarities with the concept of "stealth democracy" in its criticism of democratic politics as ineffective and of political elites as unable or unwilling to act in best interest of the country (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002). However, technocracy goes beyond dissatisfaction with the workings of politics and the wish for better outcomes.

[7] Again following representation theory, society's interests are considered to be

societal prosperity (Rosanvallon 2011). This anti-politics dimension of technocracy questions the effectiveness of the political establishment and criticizes the processes through which party-based democracy aims to find solutions for society (that is, a competition for the allocation of resources among groups).[8]

Finally, technocracy is based on the superiority of expertise and the scientific approach to the social world. It entails the belief that an essentially positivist "best solution" or "truth" for society as a whole can be identified scientifically and independently (Shils 1956). A faith in science and expertise is therefore a necessary complement to the aforementioned dimensions, emphasizing the role of rational speculation and independence. Technocracy prioritizes output, efficiency and optimal outcomes over compromise, and views society as a highly complex machine with moving parts that need to operate effectively. The technocratic mentality, therefore, entails the belief that there are neutral, non-ideologically committed experts, able to enact solutions to governance problems after evaluating evidence and facts.

We expect that citizens who hold technocratic attitudes share such views and agree with statements that reflect the three dimensions of Elitism, Anti-politics and Expertise. As theoretical arguments suggest, technocratic attitudes will stand in a close but, at the same time, conflicting relationship with populist ones (Bickerton and Invernizzi Accetti 2017; Caramani 2017). To describe accurately the challenge levelled at party-based democracy, it is essential to study technocratic and populist forces in parallel.

In contrast to technocracy's elitism, defined here as a critique of ordinary people's involvement in politics, populism is defined as a thin ideology based on people-centrism and

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"unattached" (Pitkin 1967), objective and "good for all" (Rehfeld 2011) rather than derived from the subjective preferences of specific groups.

[8] Allocation is based on neutral analysis rather than unequal power distributions between groups. The logic is not one of power and "who gets what" (Lasswell 1936) but rather one of objective identification of ideal allocation of values between groups.

anti-elitism (Mudde 2004). It exalts ordinary people for their wisdom, common sense and moral superiority. Further, it follows a Manichean view of a world that is separated into "good and evil", where any perspective or anyone who contradicts the will of the people must be part of a corrupt elite (Hawkins et al. 2012). The reliance on scientific speculation to guide policy places technocracy at odds with the populist reliance on input legitimacy and people's will as sources for policy. Yet, similarly to technocracy, populism is anti-pluralistic and recognises a unitary interest of society. It strongly distrusts parties and politicians, both as members of "the evil elite" and as carriers of particularistic interests. Populism launches a forceful critique of party-based representative democracy and its procedures, although this critique has its source in its lack of responsiveness rather than responsibility.

Studying Technocratic, Populist and Party-Democratic Approaches to Politics

Populist attitudes among citizens have been defined and measured in various empirical studies, tapping into anti-establishment sentiments, people-centrism, anti-pluralistic view of society, anti-elitism and Manichean view of the world.[9] Technocratic attitudes, however, remain largely unexplored. A first attempt was made in Robert Putnam's (1977) study on the technocratic mentality of bureaucrats. Although Putnam's typology was created specifically for the study of civil servants, it includes ideas for the measurement of objectivity, political neutrality and scientific view of policy making, which are useful for technocratic attitudes in broader citizenries.

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[9] See Akkerman et al. (2014, 2017); Castanho Silva et al. (2010, 2017); Oliver and Rahn (2016); Van Hauwaert and Van Kessel (2018); Elchardus and Spruyt (2012); Hawkins et al. (2012). Schultz et al. (2017) use three dimensions of populism (people centrism, anti-elitism and people sovereignty) instead of one as in Akkerman et al. (2014).

More recently, the concept of "stealth-democracy" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002) combines citizen preferences for less popular involvement and more effective decision-making carried out by unelected experts or business people. The authors found that a large chunk of Americans would welcome a more detached and efficient way of governing that can bypass the commotion of ordinary politics.[10] Interestingly, early work on populist attitudes by Hawkins et al. (2012) considered the stealth democracy questions to be akin to populism. Bertsou and Pastorella (2017) used the single survey item asking respondents if they consider having "experts, not government" making political decisions to be a good form of governance (used in the "stealth democracy" index and in populist attitudes measure by Akkerman et al. 2014), as a proxy for technocratic attitudes to investigate their determinants and sources of variation across Europe.

We aim to go beyond these contributions to measure technocratic attitudes based on the three dimensions of Expertise, Elitism and Anti-politics and to identify the overlaps and tensions between these and populism.[11] Theoretical treatments lead us to hypothesize a shared basis for Anti-politics between technocracy and populism, but a clear opposition on Expertise and Elitist attitudes, i.e. a preference of highly skilled and educated experts over the less knowledgeable people in the case of technocratic attitudes and the belief in the wisdom of

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[10] The four survey items are: (1) "It would be better for the country if politicians stopped talking and concentrated on solving actual problems"; (2) "compromise in politics is really selling out one's principles"; (3) "this country would run better if political decisions were left up to successful business leaders"; (4) "this country would run better if political decisions were left up to experts instead of politicians and citizens" (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002).

[11] While attitudes towards forms of government have a psychological underlying component, they are also shaped by the experiences and political context in which they are formed. Technocratic attitudes reflect citizens' evaluations of the people and processes of political decision making. In this sense, perceptions about the existing political structures, actors and their performance unavoidably influence the way citizens think about alternative forms of governance, be it populist or technocratic.

ordinary people in the case of populism.[12]

Although both populist and technocratic attitudes criticize politicians and parties, their criticism has different sources. Citizens with technocratic preferences should prefer decision-making by a political leader with knowledge and skills (even if they belong to a party and the political establishment) over decision making by ordinary citizens. If one cannot separate between technocratic and populist attitudes, it might be that our instruments are simply capturing citizen frustration and diffuse dissatisfaction. This is best described by an "anti-status quo" stance, rather than a "pro-something" position and significantly differs from what the theory of technocracy or populism prescribes.[13]

To identify people who harbour technocratic attitudes, we should be looking for a combination of a strong elitist, expertise and anti-politics stance with an aversion to the people-centrism of populism. On the contrary, citizens who follow a populist profile should hold strong people-centric preferences, an aversion to elitism and expertise in politics, but share an anti-politics stance. While citizens who fall on the third pole of the "Technocracy–Populism–Party democracy triangle" in terms of their preferences, should reject anti-political and populist views, essentially capturing a pro-pluralist democratic stance where elites are governing through political parties.

Further, we would expect these groups to exhibit some differences in their demographics, attitudes and behaviour. Technocratic minded citizens would be different from those who follow a populist or partisan democratic profile in their level of education, due to the

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[12] Evidence has shown that elitist statements that make explicit reference to independent expertise are positively related to populist attitudes (Akkerman et al. 2014).

[13] Prominent examples of this "inconsistency" in citizen preferences include Hibbing and Theiss-Morse's (2002) findings for a simultaneous wish for more and less citizen involvement in politics and Egan's (2014) finding of double-peaked policy preferences, which he has aptly named "do something politics".

emphasis they place on the superior skills of a knowledge-elite and the scientific approach to politics. We would also expect them to show low trust in political institutions, given their criticism of politics as irresponsible and ineffective. However, while citizens who espouse a technocratic approach to politics must have lower trust than partisan citizens, they should be more trusting than those with populist attitudes, who are clearly against the "evil" corrupt elite and democratic institutions that do not immediately enforce the people's will.

Finally, considering the implications of such attitudes for political behaviour, we would expect citizens who follow a partisan and technocratic profile to shy away from supporting populist parties. While the former would find a natural object of support in established parties, it is unclear where technocratic minded citizens would turn to during elections. Therefore, the size of such a group and the prevalence of technocratic attitudes among the electorate has important implications for the way politicians and party platforms choose to present themselves to attract the support of those citizens.

Operationalization and Data

We created a battery of 12 items to tap into the three underlying dimensions of technocratic attitudes. The items are phrased as attitude statements with which respondents can agree/disagree on a seven-point scale. Items are presented in Table 1 and are categorised according to the dimensions they aim to capture: Elitism, Anti-politics, Expertise.[14]

- Three items tap into "Elitism" and the limited political abilities of ordinary people. Items

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[14] The use of seven-point scales for attitude measurement offers a wide enough number of response categories to gather information on the strength and distribution of respondent attitudes, yet is concise enough to avoid a central tendency bias (Miller 1956; Alwin and Krosnick 1991; Schwartz 2003; Petrzelka et al. 2013).

EL1 and EL3 juxtapose the lack of knowledge people have in politics with that of experts, while EL2 follows a "trustee" model of representation, suggesting leaders should make decisions according to their best judgement.[15] This item proves to be one of the least popular statements but adds variation in our battery. Item EL4 suggests that people's particularistic interests is evidence of their lack of understanding.

- Four items, EXP1–EXP4, tap into "Expertise" with an emphasis on skills and knowledge. Items EXP1 and EXP4 focus on the complexities of modern governance and the need for problem solving, while items EXP2 and EXP3 emphasize the need for leaders with superior education and a scientific approach to society's problems.

- Finally, items AP1–AP4 tap into "Anti-politics" and citizens' dissatisfaction with representative politics. Item AP1 contrasts experts with elected politicians whereas AP3 and AP4 criticize the short-termism and partisan interests of representatives. Item AP2 takes aim at political parties.

In addition, we include a series of items used in the populism literature to gauge populist attitudes in relation to technocratic ones. Table 2 presents the items as well as their source. We acknowledge that there is an ongoing debate about the single best scale and the dimensionality of populist attitudes, but we follow Akkerman et al. (2014) and Van Hauwaeret and Van Kessel (2017) who have measured attitudes on a single scale. To increase comparability with previous studies, the phrasing of the populist items has been kept identical to the original source. Item M1 captures the "Manichean" view of society in the populist thin ideology. We include this

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[15] Item EL3 is reverse coded and is taken from the British Election Study 2016 where it appeared as a measure for anti-intellectualism.

Table 1 Survey items measuring technocratic attitudes

Items	Scale	Phrasing
EL1	Elitism	Ordinary people don't know what policies are good for them.
EL2		Political leaders should make decisions according to their best judgment, not the will of the people.
EL3		I'd rather put my trust in the wisdom of ordinary people than the opinions of experts. (R)
EL4		If people were knowledgeable enough, everyone would agree on the political decisions that are best for the country.
EXP1	Expertise	Politicians should be like managers and fix what does not work in society.
EXP2		The leaders of my country should be more educated and skilled than ordinary citizens.
EXP3		Social problems should be addressed based on scientific evidence, not ideological preferences.
EXP4		The problems facing my country require experts to solve them.
AP1	Anti-politics	The best political decisions are taken by experts who are not politicians.
AP2		Political parties do more harm than good to society.
AP3		Politicians just want to promote the interests of those who vote for them and not the interest of the whole country.
AP4		Politicians spend all their time seeking re-election instead of fixing problems.

item given its theoretical importance for the concept of populism, even though it is often empirically problematic.

All items were first piloted with a sample of British citizens and were subsequently included in a survey fielded in nine European democracies in 2017. The country sample includes two Eastern (Poland and Romania), two Northern (Sweden and the Netherlands), two Southern (Italy and Greece) and three Western European countries (Germany, France, the UK). Three countries experienced technocratic or technocrat-led cabinets in the past decade: the

Table 2 Survey items measuring populist attitudes

Items	*Phrasing (as in original source)*	*Source of phrasing*
POP1	Politicians need to follow the will of the people.	Akkerman et al. (2014)
POP2	The people, not the politicians, should make our most important policy decisions.	Akkerman et al. (2014)
POP3	I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician.	Akkerman et al. (2014)
POP4	I take pride in being an ordinary person.	Castanho Silva et al. (2015)
POP5	It's important for a political leader to be like the people he or she represents.	Castanho Silva et al. (2015)
M1	Politics is ultimately a struggle between good and evil.	Akkerman et al. (2014)

Monti government in Italy (2011), the Papademos government in Greece (2011) and the Ciolos government in Romania (2016). Further, coordinated market economies such as Sweden, the Netherlands and Germany, have a different experience of incorporating and relying on expertise through institutionalized practices (Maasen and Weingart 2005). Being able to measure technocratic attitudes and identify citizens with a technocratic profile in such diverse contexts supports the external validity and generalizability of the findings.

The survey was administered online using a professional survey company that specializes in online survey research and provides adult national samples that are representative of the population according to age, gender and location. Sample sizes for each country are between N=1,008 and 1,096 (Greece and the Netherlands respectively), adding to a total pool of N=9,449 respondets.[16]

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[16] Information about respondent recruitment, how country samples compare to other surveys, as well as information about the distribution of post-stratification weights in each country, is available in the Online Appendix (Appendix 2). For the codebook, see AUTHORS (2017).

Technocracy as Expertise, Anti-politics and Elitism and Its Relation to Populism

To determine the existence of the different dimensions of technocratic attitudes measured by the new survey items, we carried out a factor analysis on all 12 items, using an oblique rotation to extract factors. Results for the pooled sample of nine countries, as well as for each country calculated individually, show the presence of three factors with an Eigenvalue larger than 1.0, which capture Expertise, Anti-politics and Elitism, and explain approximately 50% of the total variance. [17] Expertise and Anti-politics items load on the two factors as expected. AP1 is the only item that cross-loads on both, as it refers to experts but emphasizes their superiority over politicians. We retain this item as a measure of Anti-politics, since in most country analyses it loads more heavily on Anti-politics. The items used to tap into elitist attitudes "behave" in a more unpredicted manner. EL3 ("trust ordinary people rather than experts") loads heavily and negatively on Anti-politics (essentially capturing a pro-politics stance). EL4 load on Elitism, but the loading is too low for the pooled sample and remains modest in most country analyses.

In addition to identifying dimensions of technocratic attitudes, we test how items of Anti-politics, Elitism and Expertise are distinguishable from Populism ones. We therefore include all technocracy and populist items in a factor analysis to test whether the latter form a distinct dimension and locate overlaps with technocracy. Results for the pooled sample are presented in Table 3. As expected, we find the presence of four factors with an Eigenvalue larger than 1, capturing again about 50% of the total variance. The three separate factors for technocratic items remain, whilst populist items group together in a fourth factor. We see some overlap between the Anti-politics and Populism items, with items POP2, POP3 and AP1 cross-loading on both those factors. This is to be expected, given that technocracy and populism share

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[17] Results are available in the Online Appendix (Appendix 3).

a critical approach to parties and politicians.

As discussed, our Elitism items focus on the shortcomings of the political involvement for ordinary people. We therefore find no overlap between these and Populism items, with the exception of M1, tapping into the Manichean view of the world. This is in line with findings by Akkerman et al. (2014). As a statement that separates the world in two groups, it bears similarities with the Elitism embedded in technocracy, which separates the world in those who know what is "correct" and those who do not. To avoid tapping into alternative psychological tendencies, we follow their suggestion and remove this item from subsequent analyses. We also remove items EL3 and EL4 from the calculations in the next section.

The Anti-politics items form a reliable scale with Chronbach's a=.71 (a=.61–.76 in individual country analyses) and the Expertise items form a somewhat weaker scale with Chronbach's a=.60 (a=.46–.65 in individual country analyses).[18] The five remaining Populism items form a reliable scale with Chronbach's a=.73 (a=.61–.77 in individual country analyses). The associations between the four constructs reveal that Expertise correlates positively with Anti-politics (r=.400 for the pooled sample and r=.240–.510 in individual country analyses, p<.01) and that it correlates positively, albeit more weakly, with Elitism (r=.110, p<.01 for the pooled sample and r=.006-.270 in individual country analyses). Elitism and Anti-politics are not significantly associated (except in the Netherlands and Sweden, where r=.120 and .150 respectively, p<.01). This is to be expected as the two Elitism items focus on a critique of "ordinary people" and, in the case of item EL2, follow the trustee model of representation, whereby politicians prioritize their own judgment over the mandate from constituents. This contradicts in part with the critique of politics entailed in the Anti-politics items.

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[18] The two Elitism items do not form a reliable scale but correlate positively (r=.105–.270 across countries) with the exception of the Netherlands, where they correlate negatively.

Table 3 Factor analysis: Nine countries, all technocracy and populist items

Items	*Factor1* *Eigenvalue 4.4*	*Factor2* *Eigenvalue 2.0*	*Factor3* *Eigenvalue 1.4*	*Factor4* *Eigenvalue 1.1*
EL1				**.632**
EL2				**.621**
EL3	-.472		.385	
EL4			.353	.343
EXP1			**.555**	
EXP2			**.685**	
EXP3			**.540**	
EXP4			**.658**	
AP1	**.471**	.375		
AP2	**.785**			
AP3	**.718**			
AP4	**.654**			
POP1		**.735**		
POP2	.396	**.496**		
POP3	.560	**.326**		
POP4		**.710**		
POP5		**.726**		
M1		.425		.486

Note: Results show item loadings following Principal Component Factoring[19] and oblique rotation (Oblimin). The four factors explain 48.5 per cent of variance. Loadings below .300 are omitted for ease of interpretation except when loading on proper factor.

For this reason, we also find a negative association between the Elitism and Populism items. Elitism items, unlike those used by Akkerman et al. (2014), clash with the people-centrism and anti-politics of populist attitudes. In their study, Elitism and Populism correlate positively, but Elitism includes items such as the statement "our country would be governed better if important decisions were left up to independent experts", which in our case are better represented by Expertise or Anti-partisan items. In fact, one interesting result we shall return to in the following sections is that, contrary to theoretical expectations, Populism correlates

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[19] Results were also calculated using other factor extraction methods that do not assume communalities to be equal to 1. Results stay the same, with factor loadings and eigenvalues scoring lower values.

positively and significantly with Expertise. As anticipated, Anti-politics and Populism scales are positively and significantly associated.[20]

Technocratic, Populist and Partisan-Democratic Citizen Profiles

Having established a way to measure the dimensions of technocratic attitudes, the second question we pose is whether we can identify citizens who exhibit the specific combination of political preferences that form the basis of technocratic attitudes. We are looking for respondents who combine high scores on Expertise, Anti-politics and Elitism, with low scores on Populism. Latent Class Analysis (LCA) is a technique to investigate the existence of distinct "profiles" based on people's responses to survey questions (Hagenaars and Halman 1989; Magidson and Vermunt 2004). Unlike factor analysis, LCA examines the similarities of response patterns and is designed to analyse heterogenous groups among the population. While LCA can be used as an exploratory tool to investigate how many meaningful citizen profiles best describe a given respondent sample, our aim is to identify substantively meaningful groups of people, in this case people who exhibit technocratic, populist and partisan profiles based on their responses to items of Expertise, Anti-politics, Elitism and Populism.

Once we decide on the best model to describe our data, based on goodness-of-fit statistics and researcher judgment, we focus on two further results from the analysis. First, we show each group's mean response value on individual items and on the four scales. Second, we

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[20] The correlation coefficient between Populism and Expertise is r=.170, p<.01 for the pooled sample (r=.140–.230 in individual country analyses, with the exception of Greece, r=-.080, and Great Britain, r=.070). Populism and Anti-politics are correlated at r=.440, p<.01 in the pooled sample (r=.270–.550 in individual country analyses). Populism and Elitism are negatively correlated, r= -.225, p<.01 in the pooled sample (r= -.338 to -.165 in individual country analyses, with the exception of the Netherlands, r=.070).

estimate the probability that respondents belong to each class and, assigning each respondent to one class following the modal probability of class membership, we calculate the size of each class and investigate its characteristics.

Figure 1 shows profile plots following a six-class model, using the pooled sample of nine countries. The six-class model fits our data well, with a lower BIC compared to the five-class model and a clear identification of the profiles of interest (BIC: 446886 compared to 449008 for 5-class model). Each line in the graph corresponds to one class of respondents. The lines trace the classes' mean score (seven-point scale on the y-axis) on each item (x-axis). From these plots, we can easily discern the three profiles of interest: a technocratic (Class 1, in red), a populist (Class 4, in dark grey) and a partisan democratic profile (Class 2, in green).[21]

Table 4 displays the mean scores of each class on the Expertise, Anti-politics, Elitism and Populism scales, as well as the estimated size of each class. We label Class 1 *Technocratic*, as it exhibits the combination of responses associated to technocratic attitudes. It has the highest scores on the Expertise (6.15) and Elitism (4.14) scales, a high score on Anti-politics (5.42), but clearly below average and the second-lowest score on the Populism scale (4.35).

Class 4 has the highest Populism (6.23) and Anti-politics (5.87) scores and the lowest Elitism score (3.06). We label this class *Populist* and Class 3 (which is similar but not as extreme) *Moderate Populist*, insofar as they follow the blend of dimensions in line with theoretical expectations. A surprising finding, which is not prescribed by the theory of populism, is that populist profiles also register a strong preference for expertise in politics. We

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[21] The R package PoLCA for polytomous variable latent class analysis does not allow applying weights. As a robustness check, we have expanded the original dataset according to the sampling weight of each observation i (obs_i x $weight_i$ x 100) and then calculated a six-class model. Results and goodness-of-fit indicators are shown in the Online Appendix (Appendix 5). Class percentages are in line with those obtained in the non-weighted original dataset shown in the last column of Table 5. We use the original dataset for subsequent analyses.

Figure 1 Profile plots for six-class LCA model: Nine countries

consistently find, across all nine countries, that there is no populism without expertise. Meaning that the classes that score highest on the populism items invariably score highly on Expertise items, emphasizing the role of problem-solving skills, scientific evidence and high education. This strong preference for outsider expertise in politics poses further questions for scholars of populism and point towards a powerful platform for populist leaders to appropriate forms of expertise, in order to justify their political decisions.

Concerning the third corner of the triangle Technocracy–Populism–Party democracy, Class 2 displays a combination of responses one would expect from citizens that embrace neither a populist view of democracy nor a technocratic legitimacy, and which we label *Partisan*. What characterizes this class is the low Anti-politics score, indicating citizens who accept democratic competition, compromise and intermediation by parties of plural interests in society. At the same time, they have the lowest score on Populism indicating that their democratic view is not "illiberal" in the sense of an uncritical and unconstrained reliance on people's will. These are the citizens who believe in the role of parties and politicians and overall

Table 4 Group profile mean scores on all dimensions and group size: nine countries

| Latent classes	Expertise	Anti-politics	Elitism	Populism	Class Size (%)
Class 1 (*Technocratic*)	6.15	5.42	4.14	4.35	13.0
Class 2 (*Partisan*)	4.56	3.38	3.43	4.18	17.0
Class 3 (*Moderate Populist*)	5.24	5.33	3.22	5.83	25.0
Class 4 (*Populist*)	5.81	5.87	3.06	6.23	16.0
Class 5 (*Tracker*)	4.84	4.49	3.79	4.66	24.5
Class 6 (*Mid Responses*)	4.24	4.09	3.80	4.30	4.5
Overall	5.19	4.84	3.50	5.08	100.0

Notes: Models calculated using the poLCA package in R. Overall means calculated following class assignment for six classes (pooled sample) by modal posterior probability. Size refers to percentages of respondents assigned to each class.

prefer the functioning of representative democracy to alternatives. However, they are not particularly anti-elitist (as political personnel is valued beyond its mere responsiveness) and trust the expertise of politicians (as indicated in the second-lowest score on Expertise).

Across the entire sample, the *Technocratic* class accounts for approximately 13% and the *Partisan* class for 17% of respondents. While the numbers vary across the nine countries, the number of citizens we expect to hold technocratic attitudes across Europe is by no means negligible. The *Populist* class itself makes up approximately 16% of the respondents. As mentioned, Class 3 is similar but not as extreme as the *Populist* class. This is a large class with 25% of respondents displaying this particular pattern of "moderate" populist attitudes.[22] The remaining two classes do not display profiles going in any of the three directions of the Technocracy–Populism–Party democracy triangle. Class 5 (*Tracker*) groups together a relatively large chunk of respondents (24.5%) who appear to track average responses across all

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[22] Given the large size of this group, it is likely that at least part of these response patterns are motivated more by a frustration over the current state of politics rather than a populist or technocratic view of the world. This is more a "do something" mentality.

Figure 2 Mean scores of technocratic, populist and partisan classes on expertise, anti-politics, elitism and populism.

survey items and Class 6 (*Mid responses*) includes a small percentage of respondents (4.5%) who appear to select the middle value across all items (value 4 on the 1–7 scale).

The results above refer to the pooled sample of respondents from nine very different European countries. Nevertheless, we find a similar pattern of the citizen profiles across all nine countries. What differs is the relative class size. Figure 2 plots the mean scores on the four scales for the *Technocratic*, *Partisan* and *Populist* classes, for the pooled sample (left panel) and for each country (right panel), showing that these three identifiable citizen profiles across Europe indeed "behave" in a similar manner. This lends further support to our findings, showing that technocratic attitudes have a similar structure irrespectively of national political culture, historical trajectories and political developments in each country. Table 5 shows the size of the three profiles of interest in each country. It shows technocratic attitudes have crystallized for a larger share of the population in the Southern and Central/Eastern European countries in our sample. Technocratic minded citizens are plentiful in Greece (19%), Romania and Poland

Table 5 Class assignment per country (%)

Countries	Class 1 (Techno-cratic)	Class 2 (Partisan)	Class 3 (Moderate Populist)	Class 4 (Populist)	Class 5 (Tracker)	Class 6 (Mid Responses)
Germany	6.5	24.0	27.0	10.5	27.0	5.0
France	10.0	12.0	29.0	17.5	26.5	5.5
Great Britain	7.5	16.5	29.0	11.0	30.0	6.0
Greece	19.0	11.0	28.0	19.5	18.5	3.0
Italy	13.5	8.5	28.0	27.5	16.5	5.5
Netherlands	7.5	28.5	19.0	6.5	34.0	4.5
Poland	18.0	11.0	26.5	16.0	26.5	2.5
Romania	18.0	12.5	19.5	37.0	10.5	2.0
Sweden	8.0	33.0	25.0	8.5	25.0	6.5

Notes: Class membership assigned by modal posterior probability following a six-class Latent Class Model for the pooled sample.

(18%), Italy (13.5%) and to a lesser degree France (10%), while in the remaining Northern and Western European countries they constitute a smaller percentage.

Who's Who: Comparing *Technocratic*, *Populist* and *Partisan* Citizen Profiles

How, if at all, do citizens that follow a technocratic, populist or partisan profile differ in terms of demographic characteristics, other attitudes and behaviour? As discussed, we would expect people who follow different approaches to politics to also show differences in certain other characteristics and behaviour.

We first turn to evaluate the factors that make it more likely for a respondent to be assigned to one rather than another class and, subsequently, we look at voting intentions across the classes of interest. We carry out a series of multinomial logistic regressions with class assignment as the dependent variable and focus on the comparisons between the likelihood of being assigned to the three classes of interest: the likelihood of being assigned to the *Populist*

Figure 3 Determinants of assignment into classes: nine-country pooled sample

Note: Figure shows plotted coefficients and 95% confidence intervals of second stage multinomial logit models. Results are robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects and jackknife estimation clustering observations at the country level.

class as opposed to the *Technocratic (Model I)*; the likelihood of being assigned to the *Partisan* class as opposed to the *Technocratic (Model II)*; and the likelihood of being assigned to the *Populist* class as opposed to the *Partisan (Model III)*. We examine the role of political interest, political trust, ideological self-placement and demographic characteristics (level of education, age, gender). Figure 3 shows coefficient plots from multinomial logistic regressions (full regression results in Table 7 in the appendix).[23] In line with theoretical expectations, we find

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[23] Political interest is a four-point scale "not at all interested", "not very interested",

Figure 4 Predicted probabilities of assignment to the Technocratic, Partisan and Populist class

for education

Note: Points indicate posterior means and segments represent 95% credible intervals for the marginal effects. Nine-country pooled sample.

that respondents' level of education is associated with class assignment, with higher education

making it more likely for a respondent to belong to the technocratic class as opposed to the

populist or partisan class. A one unit increase in education (say, from a high school degree to a

technical degree) reduces the odds of being assigned to the populist or to the partisan as opposed

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"somewhat interested", "very interested". Political trust is a seven-point scale between 1 and 7 combining trust in the national parliament, in political parties and in the EU (results do not change if variables are included separately). The left–right variable ranges between 1 and 10. Education is operationalized in seven levels: primary, secondary, high school or practical apprenticeship, technical degree, university bachelor, master and PhD.

Figure 5 Predicted probabilities of assignment to the Technocratic, Partisan and Populist class for political trust

Note: Points indicate posterior means and segments represent 95% credible intervals for the marginal effects. Nine-country pooled sample.

to the technocratic class (relative risk ratios are .76 and .87 respectively), holding all other variables constant. Predicted probabilities in Figure 4 show more clearly the role of education and, while effect sizes may seem small, one needs to bear in mind education is coded in only seven categories according to the highest level attained by respondents.

Political trust is also a significant predictor of class assignment across all comparisons. Again in line with our expectations, higher political trust is associated with membership to the partisan rather than the technocratic or populist class. Nevertheless, technocratic attitudes are associated with stronger political trust than populist attitudes (the relative odds of membership

to the populist class as opposed to the technocratic class is .67 for a 1-point increase in trust), confirming a preference for elite, rather than mass-driven decision making. Again, predicted probabilities show clearly how an increase in political trust decreases the likelihood of assignment to the populist class and increases the likelihood of assignment to the partisan class (Figure 5). Effects are significant across all nine countries.

An unexpected result is the effect of left–right ideological placement of respondents. Across all countries, left-wing ideology is associated with assignment to the partisan class as opposed to the technocratic or populist class. It seems that respondents with party democratic attitudes are placed more on the left than those with technocratic or populist ones. Interestingly, however, left–right ideological placement has no effect on the likelihood of being assigned to the *Technocratic* compared to the *Populist* class, confirming the common non-ideological nature of these two sets of attitudes. The only exceptions are Italy and Sweden where a self-placement more on the right is associated with falling on the *Populist,* as opposed to the *Technocratic* class.[24] Finally, political interest does not have a significant effect on class assignment in the pooled sample, but we find significant results in the case of France, Greece, Italy and Poland where higher political interest increases the likelihood of following a technocratic as opposed to a populist profile.

Will These Groups Behave Differently in the Voting Booth?

We have shown that in most of the countries under study there is a sizeable group of citizens who hold technocratic political attitudes and that this type of profile is distinct from the populist

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[24] Multinomial logistic regression results and coefficient plots for individual country analysis are available in the Online Appendix (Appendix 6).

and partisan representation profile. This raises the question: who do these citizens vote for come election time? This is a group of citizens that should not be attracted by large established political parties nor by a populist rhetoric. The assumption we make, is that partisan attitudes are associated with voting for traditional parties, while populist attitudes will be associated with support for populist candidates and parties, wherever these are present. However, there is no obvious outlet for citizens who hold technocratic attitudes. In this last section, we look at the voting intentions of respondents who fall in the *Technocratic*, *Partisan* or *Populist* class. We choose to look at the case of Italy, with populist parties of the left and the right, traditional parties of the centre-left and centre-right and a recent technocratic government experience, rather than a cross-country classification of parties into European-wide families.[25]

Table 6 presents voting intentions for the main parties in Italy for each of the three classes as well as the difference with the country average. The last column shows country-wide percentages across all parties. Over a third of respondents assigned to the *Populist* class (35.2%) declare a voting intention for the Five Star Movement (M5S), the recent anti-establishment populist party. This is 6.4 percentage points higher than the country average, showing an over-representation of support for M5S among this class, as is the case to a lesser extent for the populist extreme right party, the League.[26] On the contrary, respondents assigned to the *Partisan* class intend to vote for the two populist parties in much smaller numbers (15.5 percentage points less than the country average for M5S and 4.4 percentage points less for the League). Partisans favour more strongly a typical non-populist party such as the centre-left

[25] The question is phrased as follows: "If there were a general election tomorrow, which party would you vote for?"

[26] The survey was fielded in June 2017. Actual results in the March 2018 Italian national elections (lower house, PR votes) are: M5S 32.7%, League 17.4%, Forza Italia 14.0%, Democratic Party 18.8%, others 17.1%. Importantly, these percentages are calculated on valid votes, not the electorate, and thus do not include the abstention rate (27.1%). The two sets of figures are therefore not comparable.

Table 6 Voting intention in Italy

Political party	Technocratic class		Partisan class		Populist class		Country average
	%	≠	%	≠	%	≠	%
Five Star Movement	27.9	**-0.9**	13.3	**-15.5**	35.2	**+6.4**	28.8
League	7.9	**-3.4**	6.9	**-4.4**	13.3	**+2.0**	11.3
Forza Italia	6.0	-4.0	6.8	-3.2	10.6	+0.6	10.0
Democratic Party	25.6	**+10.6**	31.0	**+16.0**	5.7	**-9.3**	15.0
Others	19.6	+3.3	18.9	+2.6	15.8	-0.5	16.3
Would not vote	13.0	-5.6	23.1	+4.5	19.4	+0.8	18.6
Total	100.0		100.0		100.0		100.0

Notes: Only parties above 5% shown. Differences (≠) with country average shown.

mainstream Democratic Party (which is in line with results for the left placement on the left-right ideological spectrum above).

Lastly, voting intentions of respondents falling in the *Technocratic* class, paint an interesting picture. We see that more than a quarter of respondents in this class support the anti-establishment populist M5S, while another quarter supports the traditional centre-left Democratic Party. While, support for the two populist parties is below the country average, they do manage to attract sympathizers among this group. This may be interpreted as a sign that populism and technocracy overlap to a certain extent in practice or as a result of the lack of alternatives for political change. Supporters of the Democratic Party are over-represented in the technocratic class (10 percentage points higher than the country average). What is also interesting is that respondents in this group do not appear to be driven away from the electoral process in greater numbers than the country average. As discussed, studying the implications of technocratic attitudes for electoral behaviour poses a caveat due to the different nature of the challenge to party democracy coming from populism and technocracy. Whereas the former is channelled by parties that take part in the electoral competition, the latter has never produced

an electoral alternative. There is no such thing as a "technocratic party" in the same way as the literature speaks of populist parties.[27] While some parties promote reliance on expertise through their rhetoric and personnel, for the most part technocratic-minded citizens may be up for grabs as voters.

Conclusion

The classical model of political representation as mediated by political parties through articulation and aggregation (APSA 1950; Schattschneider 1942) has come under increasing strain between calls for either more responsiveness or responsibility. While recent work has demonstrated theoretically the relevance of two types of challenges to party democracy – the populist and the technocratic (Caramani 2017) – empirical research has exclusively focussed on the former. The latter has only been addressed indirectly in terms of stealth democracy (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse 2002), incompletely in terms of elitism (Akkerman et al. 2014) or using a single survey item (Bertsou and Pastorella 2017).

Our contribution has been to conceptualize the dimensions of technocratic attitudes and measure them at mass level across nine European countries using a novel survey battery . This allows us to move the discussion from a theoretical to an empirical ground and clarify the empirical conundrums that have accompanied research in populism. Our results provide an empirical confirmation of the dimensionality of technocracy derived from theory. One of the theoretical expectations stemming from the principles of technocracy and populism, is that there

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[27] One such party in Italy may be Civic Choice with Monti for Italy, clearly perceived as a technocratic party having been founded by former technocratic prime minister Monti. This party did not run in the 2018 election. In our survey, it has received a very negligible amount of voting intentions, most of which coming from respondents assigned to the technocratic class.

are overlaps between the two, in particular the opposition to pluralist party-democracy. Populist attitudes indeed align with Anti-politics, namely scepticism toward the articulation of particularistic interests and pluralist vision of representation clashing with the holistic idea of society, as well as the negative evaluation of parties, politicians and the functioning of politics overall.[28]

A further contribution is the identification of citizen groups based on the attitudes they exhibit towards politics. We suggested that technocratic attitudes entail a specific combination of Elitism, Expertise and Anti-politics. Using latent class analysis, we were able to investigate this heterogeneity, identify groups of citizens that follow a *Technocratic*, *Populist* or *Partisan* profile and investigate overlaps and contrasts. We were able to trace a group representing approximately 13% of citizens across the nine European countries, who support the idea of a knowledgeable elite making decision on behalf of a population considered insufficiently prepared to address complex issues. This group is larger in Southern and Eastern European countries, but can be found across Europe. This finding adds force to the claim that the model of responsible party government, which has dominated in Western democracies in the second half of the 20th century, is challenged not only by populism but also by technocracy. While, so far, this claim relied on theoretical speculation, this paper supports its empirical relevance.

Our findings need to be put in perspective. First, individuals with populist attitudes still outnumber those with technocratic ones. Second, respondents with attitudes in line with the pluralist articulation and aggregation of interests by parties are still very consistent. Yet beliefs around the superiority of skilful, knowledgeable and scientific experts over politicians abound

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[28] Another area of overlap is the vision of society divided in two Manichean groups, either virtuous vs. corrupt in the case of populism or competent vs. incompetent in the case of technocracy.

everywhere in spite of country differences.[29] The opening section of this article referred to the puzzle of a popular rejection of the recommendations made by technocrats *and* a simultaneous preference for independent experts over governments. While citizens who exhibit true technocratic attitudes are present in European democracies, they do not represent a plurality, yet. At the same time, a large chunk of citizens who score highly on Populism and Anti-politics, invariably showcase strong preferences for more expertise. In other words, our analysis of nine European countries finds no Populism without Expertise.

This represents a further puzzle. A simultaneous preference for more popular involvement and independent expertise over elected politicians, might be interpreted as a rejection of the current workings of representative democracy as both non-responsive and irresponsible, rather than a surge of populism. Alternatively, we need to acknowledge that populism, in practice, includes an elitist dimension regarding expertise and efficiency. This is in line with earlier work on populist attitudes and parties, which often attract voters that demand clear and "no nonsense" solutions to complex problems. Research on populist parties in Europe and Latin America has also highlighted the blurring lines between this type of elitism and populism in practice, such as the reliance on experts, the emphasis on strong charismatic leadership and the "outsider" status of leaders who are experts in their field (Taggart 2002; Fortuyn 2002; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser 2013).

The practical implications of our findings extend to the political behaviour of citizens at the voting booth, to the possible success or failure of democratic innovations and to the political entrepreneurship of elites. While it is clear that considerable segments of the

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[29] A fruitful avenue for further research is precisely the comparative exploration of the contextual influences upon citizens' attitudes towards technocracy. Existing studies try to illuminate cross-country variation (Bertsou and Pastorella 2017) but country differences may change as the double challenge to party-based government unfolds and as populist and technocratic political actors are brought in the forefront of political decision making.

population hold technocratic attitudes, there is no clear political movement, party or leader that speaks to their concerns. Furthermore, while some of these citizens may remain committed to the political establishment and support the political elite in greater numbers (as the centre-left has shown in the case of Italy), their frustration with the workings of current politics means that they may also shy away from established politicians and be drawn to anti-establishment parties. Therefore, it remains significant to acknowledge that party democracy faces a second alternative world-view besides the sirens of an unmediated and unchecked people's will, namely that of its opposite, the exclusion of people seen as unfit to deal with complex decisions.

Appendix: Table 7 Results from three multinomial logistic regressions, using class assignment as dependent variables.

	Model I	Model II	Model III
Dependent variable	Populist vs Technocratic profile	Partisan vs Technocratic profile	Populist vs Partisan profile
Independent variables			
Political interest	-.137	-.169	.0316
	(.085)	(.116)	(.111)
Political trust	-.400***	.412***	-.812***
	(.0758)	(.0665)	(.120)
Left–right	.0111	-.133***	.144***
	(.0493)	(.0333)	(.0523)
Education	-.266***	-.132***	-.134***
	(.0386)	(.0477)	(.0444)
Age	.0100***	-.00706**	.0171***
	(.00372)	(.00344)	(.00322)
Female	-.0155	-.175**	.159**
	(.114)	(.0849)	(.0760)
Urban	-.181	-.329**	.148
	(.118)	(.142)	(.191)
Constant	2.562***	1.174***	1.388***
	(.405)	(.284)	(.306)
Observations	9,449	9,449	9,449

Notes: Entries show regression coefficients with robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<.01, ** p<.05, * p<.1.

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